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INTEREST, PRINCIPAL, AND CONCEPTUAL
SEVERANCE
Abstract: When considering applications of the Takings Clause to appro-
priations of interest and principal, courts rely on the quaintly expressed
18th century rule that "interest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the
body." Since that time, an elaborate body of regulatory takings law has
evolved. As part of this evolution, courts delved into questions of temporary
takings of property, occurring both as a result of outright physical
occupation and through regulatory limitations. This Note argues that
courts should reject the old "interest follows principal" rule and adopt the
modern temporary takings rules. In particular, this Note explores the
results of such a change in three cases involving prisoners alleging an
unconstitutional taking when their interest was deposited in accounts with
the Departments of Corrections while incarcerated. Adopting a temporary
takings analysis would not only bring consistency between the analyses of
takings of money and takings of land, but also offer a more consistent
outcome within this group of prisoner interest cases.
INTRODUCTION
The law surrounding regulatory takings has been filled with con-
tradictory holdings and conflicting justifications since its inception in
1922 with Pennsylvania. Coal Co. v. Mahon.! Meanwhile, the number
and variety of situations to which the caselaw has been applied has
been steadily expanding. 2 One interesting expansion of the law has
been in the area of takings of money, and in particular, interests
Cases in this line have been decided according to a traditional com-
mon law "interest follows principal" rule, which begins by asking
whether or not principal is "owned" by the claimant, and if so, con-
cludes by finding that any loss of interest is a compensable taking. 4
See 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078
n.2 (1993) (providing a synopsis of scholarly opinions on the chaos in the field).
2 See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-35 (2003) (finding no
taking resulting from state use of interest earned on accounts); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 522-23 (1998) (finding a taking as a result of legislation requiring retroactive contri-
butions to pension plans); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984)
(finding a taking could result from legislation requiring disclosure of trade secrets).
3 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 231-35; Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-72
(1998); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160-64 (1980).
' See Brown, 538 U.S. at 235; Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165-66; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162.
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The difficulty with the common law analysis is that it presumes two
distinct, severed items, the principal and the interest it earns. 5 Regula-
tory takings law, by comparison, has developed to eliminate the kind
of severance this analysis represents, making that two-part inquiry ap-
pear artificial. 6
A strand of recent cases involving the interest earned on prison-
ers' accounts continues to present the question of how takings of in-
terest should be treated under regulatory takings law. 7 Federal circuit
courts of appeals have reached different results due to the courts'
disparate treatment of the inmates' underlying property interest. 8
This Note attempts to sidestep that disagreement by rejecting the sev-
ered principal/interest analysis and instead applies a regulatory tak-
ings approach that looks at the parcel as a whole. 9 Such an approach
brings consistency to the treatment of regulatory takings cases by
bringing the prisoner interest cases under the same caselaw that
dominates the rest of regulatory takings claims. 10
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Givens v. Ala-
bama Department of Corrections ruled that for purposes of the Takings
Clause", inmates had no protected property interest in the interest
that accrued on principal earned from work-release wages. 12 This rul-
ing permitted the Alabama Department of Corrections to retain the
interest earned on inmate accounts. 15 The Eleventh Circuit's holding
largely followed the reasoning laid out in 2000 in Washlefske v. Winston,
in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that prisoners do
not have a property interest in the interest earned on principal accu-
mulated from payments for their labor while in prison." In 1998, in
Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion, holding that because
prisoners had a property interest in the principle in their prison ac-
5 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 234-35; Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160-61.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
331 (2002); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,130 (1978).
7 See Givens v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064,1068 (11th Cir. 2004); Washlefske v.
Winston, 234 F.3d 179,185 (4th Cir. 2000); Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194,
1199 (9th Cir. 1998).
8 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1199.
9 See infra notes 133-238 and accompanying text.
1° See infra notes 65-124 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CoNsir. amend. V.
12 381 F.3d at 1070.
IS See id.
14 See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 180-81.
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count, that interest extended to the interest earned. 18 Under this rul-
ing, the California Department of Corrections did not retain the in-
terest earned on inmate accounts. 18 In each of the above examples,
the court looked to the common law rule that "interest follows prin-
ciple. "17
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the common law "in-
terest follows principal" rule and applications of the rule to prisoner
interest cases. 18 Part II outlines a brief history of regulatory takings,
the emergence of conceptual severance, and the denominator prob-
lem as formidable obstacles to developing a consistent framework for
analysis. 18 It characterizes the separation of ownership of interest and
principal in the regulatory takings analysis as one more example of
conceptual severance. 20 Part III applies a regulatory takings analysis to
the prisoner interest cases by first choosing the most appropriate test
and then applying it to find no taking. 21
I. EVOLUTION OF THE INTEREST FOLLOWS PRINCIPAL RULE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO TAKINGS
A. The History of the Interest Follows Principal Rule
The traditional common law rule that "interest follows principle"
dates to at least the eighteenth century. 22 The United States Supreme
Court first applied the rule in a Takings Clause context in 1980 in
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith." In Webb's, the Court found that
for purposes of the Takings Clause, a party had a protected property
interest in the interest earned on the monies deposited in an inter-
pleader fund, which was required by state law to be deposited with the
registry of the court while creditors were paid. 24 The State of Florida
argued that while deposited with the court, the principal and the in-
12 See 151 F.3d at 1201.
12
 See id.
17 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1067; Wastelefske, 234 F.3d at 184; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1198,
18 See infra notes 22-64 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 65-132 and accompanying text.
20 Sec infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notesI133-238 and accompanying text.
22 See Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 313,319 (1809) (holding that "interest goes
with the principal as the fruit with the tree"); Beckford v. Tobin, 27 Eng. Rep. 1049,1051
(Ch. 1749) (holding that "interest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the body").
23 See 449 U.S. 155,162 (1980).
24 Id. at 164-65.
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terest belonged to the State as "public property." 25 During that time,
the State argued, the depositor and the depositor's creditors had no
property interest in the principal, and so no property interest in the
interest it earned. 26 The language the Court used in describing its rea-
soning highlights the overlapping logic of both the "interest follows
principal" rule and the more modern doctrine of temporary takings."
The Court stated the following:
The earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the
fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property.
The state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for
the county the value of the use of the fund for the period in
which it is held in the registry. 28
In its analysis the Court focused on the ownership of the principal
during the relevant time period and described the ability to earn in-
terest on that principal as incidental to the principal itself. 29 This sug-
gests an analysis that considers the right to earn interest as just one
strand in a bundle of property rights attaching to the ownership of
the principal, rather than looking at the ownership of the interest as a
separate and distinct entity from the ownership of the principal. 30 The
Court also rejected the State's argument that appropriating the inter-
est could be characterized as a fee imposed by the court because a
separate amount, limited by statute, had already been deducted from
the principal for the payment of court fees. 31
More recently, in 1998, in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
the Supreme Court applied the "interest follows principal" rule to In-
terest on Lawyers Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") and held that lawyers'
clients have a protected property interest in the interest earned under
IOLTA legislation. 32 Because the funds held by lawyers were unargua-
bly the property of the clients, the only question for the Court was
whether or not the clients also "owned" the interest those funds gen-
29 Id. at 158-59.
26 Id.
" See id. at 164.
28




sl See id. at 162.
92 524 U.S. 156, 160, 172 (1998). In 2003, in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,
the Court went on to find that although there was a protected property interest, no com-
pensation was due because there was no value in the interest to the lawyers' clients. See 538
U.S. 216, 240 (2003).
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crated while held by the lawyer." The Court reiterated the holding of
Webb's., that a state may not appropriate the property interest created
through the traditional rule that "interest follows principal" by at-
tempting to disavow that rule with a statute, 34 It noted, in language
echoing Webb's, that one of the "incidents of ownership" of principal
was the ability to distribute the interest it earned." The Court's lan-
guage describing the ownership of the interest suggested that it was
merely another aspect of the ownership of the principal, or, hi other
words, another stick in the bundle of rights which attaches to the
principal." The analysis the Court actually applied, however, carefully
separated the question of the ownership of the interest and the own-
ership of the principal.37
Justice Stephen Breyer's dissenting opinion in Phillips attempts to
reframe the question, transforming it from one of separate interests
in principal and interest to one of a temporary intrusion into the
property interests of the principal." This Note explores the implica-
tions of Justice Breyer's alternative analysis by abandoning the old "in-
terest follows principal" rule, which analyzes interest and principal
seprately, in favor of a temporary takings analysis that treats interest as
a right of ownership that attaches to principal." It determines how
such an alternative analysis might shed light on the different conclu-
sions the federal circuit courts of appeals have reached on whether or
not a department of corrections may appropriate the interest earned
on a prisoner's principal without cornpensation. 40
B. Application of the Interest Follows Principal Rule to the
Prisoner Interest Cases
In Givens v. Alabama Department of Comections, a case decided by
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 2004, inmates in Alabama
prisons who participated in a work-release program were required by
state law to have their wages deposited with the Department of Cor-
" See Phillips, 529 U.S. at 164.
" Id. at 167.
35 See id.
55 See id. at 164.
17 See id.
" Sec Phillips, 524 U.S. at 180 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer stopped short of
the perspective this Note advocates, however, because his analysis goes on to identify a
claimant's right to earn interest independent from any other rights attaching to ownership
of principal. See id. at 181-82.
" See infra notes 133-238 and accompanying text.
Sec infra notes 133--238 and accompanying text.
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rections.41
 Fees were deducted from this account by the Department
of Corrections, but state law imposed a limit on the percentage of the
wages that could be deducted, limiting the Department to taking forty
percent of the inmates' wages as fees. 42 Alabama deducted the maxi-
mum amount allowed by statute and then deposited the remainder of
the wages in an account with the Department of Corrections in the
prisoner's name:13 Although the Department of Corrections placed
the prisoners' wages in interest-bearing accounts, the Department re-
tained the interest earned on the wages." The court sided with the
Department of Corrections, holding that there was no taking when
the Department appropriated the interest.* The court began its
analysis by stating that the Takings Clause only protects preexisting
property interests (and cannot create property interests) and such
property interests must be found in state law. 46 The court noted the
common law rule that interest follows principal. 47 It also noted, how-
ever, that at common law, prisoners had no ability to earn wages, let
alone interest." Furthermore, although legislation granted inmates a
property interest in the principal earned from their wages, the statute
granted no corresponding property interest in the interest earned on
those wages. 49 Because such a property interest had not existed at
common law, without the statutory grant, the prisoners had no claim
to the interest their principal earned.50
In 2000, in Washlefske v, Winston, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed an inmate's claims that the Virginia Department of
Corrections violated the Takings Clause when it retained the interest
earned on the principal in his account, called a "spend account," dur-
ing his incarceration.51 Unlike the Alabama statute in Givens, the Vir-
41 See 381 F.3d 1064,1065 (11th Cir. 2004).
42 See id.
42 See id.
44 See id. By comparison, in Washlefske v. Winston and Schneider u California Department of
Corrections the interest was deposited into a fund for the benefit of prisoners, invoking
some faint reciprocity of advantage argument for the Department. See Washlefske v.
Winston, 234 F.3d 179,181 (4th Cir. 2000); Schneider v. Cal. Dept of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194,
1195-96 (9th Cir. 1998). In Givens there is no mention of how the appropriated interest is
spent. See 381 F.3d at 1065.
42 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070.
48 Id. at 1067.
47
 See id.
48 Id, at 1068-69.
49 See id. at 1070.
5° Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069.
21 234 F.3d at 180. The principal in the account was earned through payments in com-
pensation for labor while in prison, at a rate of 90 cents/hour. Id. at 181. The interest ap-
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ginia statute in Washlefske enabled inmates to send funds outside the
prison to be invested in interest bearing accounts on their behalf. 52
The "spend accounts" at issue in Washlefske were maintained for the
purpose of allowing the inmates a source from which to spend money
while in prison.53 The court began, as the Eleventh Circuit later would
in Givens, by noting that at common law a prisoner had no property
interest in the results of his labor." Any property interest an inmate
had in money earned from labor, the court reasoned must be the re-
sult of a specific grant of a property interest by state statute. 55
 In this
case, the statute which granted inmates the right to earn wages also
explicitly dictated that control over the interest earned from those
wages would vest in the prison official, not in the inmate himself."
The statute only "gave" the wages to inmates for use while in prison
under certain limited circumstances, and the limited rights granted by
statute not only did not mention interest with respect to inmates, but
explicitly gave the ownership of the interest to the Department of
Corrections.°
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came to a different
conclusion in Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, holding
that the right to receive interest income generated on the principal was
a sufficiently fundamental property interest associated with the owner-
ship of the principal that a state could not appropriate the interest
without violating the Fifth Amendment." The Schneider court acknowl-
edged that the statute did not explicitly grant ownership of the interest
itself to the inmates—the same argument later presented in Washlefske
and Givens.59 In fact, in Schneider, as in Washlefske, a statute explicitly as-
signed ownership of the interest to the Department of Corrections.°
Nevertheless, the Schneider court noted that the existence of a statute
giving the property interest to someone other than the inmate was not
sufficient to show that the inmate had no right to the interest. 61 Citing
propriated by the Department of Corrections was used for the general benefit of inmates




54 See id. at 184-85. The court went further, pointing out that at early common law an
inmate had no right to hold personal property at all. Set id. at 185.
55
 See id.
56 See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
57 See id. at 181.
58 151 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Webb's, in which a state statute entitled the court clerk to keep the in-
terest, and Phillips, in which state law required IOLTA contributions,
Schneider held that under some circumstances a state's declaration that
no property right existed was not sufficient to extinguish such a prop-
erty right.62 In weighing the statute which eliminated the inmate's
property interest against the common law rule that "interest follows
principal," the court found the common law rule prevailed because of
its long pedigree and near universal endorsement by American
courts. 63 The court held that the "interest follows principal" rule to be
sufficiently fundamental that a state violated the Fifth Amendment if it
attempted to change that rule by statute."
II. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION TO TAKINGS OF INTEREST
Regulatory takings analysis, compared to the common law "inter-
est follows principal" rule, has more recent origins. 65 For the first 130
years after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the protection
granted in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was under-
stood to be limited to require compensation for physical appropria-
tions of property under the state's power of eminent domain. 66 In
1922, the United States Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, which for the first time required compensation for a taking
that resulted not from the physical invasion or appropriation of prop-
erty, but from the imposition of government regulations that limited
the owner's use of the property. 67 Whereas in one sense this innova-
tion addressed the inequity of compensating for physical appropria-
tions and not regulations imposing comparable economic harm, it
also created a set of new complications. 68 In the wake of the Pennsyl-
62 See id.
63 See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1201.
64 See id. The court in Schneider comes to this conclusion with no mention of the com-
peting common law tradition that prisoners have no rights to earn wages or interest. See id.
But see Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068; Washlefske, 234 F.Sd at 186.
65 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
66 See U.S. Cows -r. amend. V; Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879);
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871).
67 See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS
13-63 (1995).
69 Sec Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415; see also RICHARD A. EPS'ITIN, TAKINGS 57-58, 63-64
(1985); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV, 1165, 1184-90 (1967) (reviewing the
inequities resulting from using physical invasion as the primary test for compensation).
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vania Coal decision, courts were left to decide what regulations were
legitimate exercises of the police power of the state (like zoning regu-
lations and nuisance laws) and what regulations were so excessive that
they required compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 69
 This
proved to be a challenging task. 7°
A. The Penn Central Multifactor Test, the Denominator Problem, and the
Question of Conceptual Severance
The modern multifactor approach to regulatory takings analysis
was outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1978 in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 71 In that case, the Court applied
an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y1" to determine whether or not
a governmental action rose to the level of a taking. 72 One of the fac-
tors the Court considered was the economic impact of the regula-
tion." A second factor was the regulation's interference with distinct,
investment-backed expectations of the claimant. 74 The third factor
was the character of the governmental action, including whether or
not there was a physical invasion of the property, as well as determin-
ing whether or not the regulation arose merely "from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to pro-
mote the common good."75 Although courts have struggled with how
to apply these factors, they have remained the primary framework for
deciding regulatory takings cases. 76 In combination, the three factors
compare the economic impact of the regulation in question on the
69 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992) (finding a tak-
ing where limits on use destroyed all economic value in property); Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty, Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-97 (1926) (finding no taking as a result of zoning regu-
lations); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1915) (finding no taking as a
result of limits of use as for purposes of nuisance regulation).
7° See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); sec also
EPSTEIN, supra note 68, at 107; Rubenfeld, Supra note 1, at 1088-91 (reviewing the conflict
between various factors and principles used in defining takings).






" See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also FISCH EL, supra note 67, at 50-51; Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles: Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV,
1299, 1317 (1989); Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1089-91 (reviewing the conflict between
various factors and principles used in defining takings).
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individual property owner with the extent and importance of the pub-
lic benefit it creates."
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court carved out an exception to the
multifactor test articulated in Penn. Central. 78 In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, the Court adopted a per se rule that declared that in
the "extraordinary circumstance" in which a regulation caused a prop-
erty owner to lose all economically beneficial uses of the land, a taking
necessarily resulted." The Court justified this rule by looking at the
background principles and common law rules that predated the regula-
tion in question 80 To support this rule, the Court noted that real prop-
erty owners hold title with the expectation that it will be subject to some
regulation that might limit its value, but not that all economic value
could be lost through regulation. 81 Only when preexisting background
principles or common law suggested that the owner should have ex-
pected the possibility of losing all economic uses could such a regula-
tion have avoided the requirement of compensation. 82
The introduction of the Lucas per se rule exacerbated a problem
inherent in even the very first regulatory takings cases—that of de-
termining against which parcel the diminution in value should be
measured—a problem often referred to as finding the appropriate
denominator.85 Justice Brandeis raised the difficulty of determining
appropriate denominators in his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal, noting that in order to evaluate the extent of the diminution of
property value, a point of reference is needed to be meaningful. 84 The
harm resulting from a regulation will vary depending on whether one
measures the loss against just the portion of the parcel affected by the
regulation, the parcel as measured by its physical boundaries, or even
77 See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed.- Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddy 57 S.
CAL. L. Rev. 561, 593-94 (1984).
78 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
79 See id. at 1017, 1019. The Court reiterated the importance and difficulty of finding
no economic use in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. See
535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002).
80 See Lucas, 505 U.S, at 1027.
81 See id. at 1027-28. The Lucas rule is explicitly limited to land. See id. The Court
stated that In the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high
degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner of personal property] ought to be
aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically
worthless." See id. at 1027. This limitation lends support to the argument that the Lucas per
se rule has no place in a Takings Clause case concerning money. See id.
92 Sec id.
83 See id. at 1016 n.7; Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
84 See 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2005]	 Interest, Principal, and Conceptual Severance 	 873
the parcel as measured against all the property held by the owner af-
fected by the regulation. 85 Manipulating denominators along physical
boundaries and conceptual lines complicates the measurement prob-
lem." Conceptually, property owners could divide ownership into the
individual "sticks" of the bundle representing the collection of rights
with respect to property. 87 According to such a division, any reduction
in the ability of an owner to use property might be recharacterized as
a total loss of one individual stick in the bundle—the stick corre-
sponding to the use limited or forbidden by the regulation. 88 This
manipulation is often referred to as "conceptual severance." 89 Such a
characterization has the potential to at least strengthen the economic
impact prong of the multifactor Penn Central test and to at most in-
voke the per se "total economic loss" rule created in Lucas in all but
select cases involving relatively small losses of value."
The application of the "economic impact" and "investment-
backed expectations" prongs of the multifactor test in Penn Central
illustrates the effect of the denominator problem 9 1 In Penn Central,
the owners of Grand Central Station claimed that they lost all value of
the right to develop the space above the station when the Landmarks
Preservation Commission designated Grand Central Station a land-
mark under New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law, thereby
83 See Michelman, supra note 68, at 1192; Rose, supra note 77, at 566-69; Rubenfeld,
supra note 1, at 1090-91 (discussing the results of the denominator problem as it appears
in Penn Cenral and Keystone). Compare Pa. Coal, 250 U.S. at 414 (holding that laws restricting
coal mining operations resulted in a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. De.
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497-502 (1987) (finding nearly identical laws resulted in no tak-
ing, due primarily to a manipulation of the relevant denominator).
86 Sec. e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,65-66 (1979) (rejecting an attempt at sever-
ing the right to alienation); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130 (rejecting an attempt at severing air
rights); see also Michelman, supra note 68, at 1192-93 (describing the results of conceptual
severance); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 Comm. L. REV. 1667,1676 (1988) (describing the emergence of
conceptual severance).
87 See, e.g., Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130; see also Michelman,
supra note 68, at 1193 (describing the results of conceptual severance); Radin, supra note
86 (describing an application of conceptual severance).
88 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7; Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 419, (Brandeis, j., dissenting);
see also Michelman, supra note 68, at 1193 (describing the illogical extremes of conceptual
severance); Radin, supra note 86 (describing some applications of conceptual severance,
and the Court's wariness).
89 Sec Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331; Raclin, supra note 86.
9° See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331; see also Michelman, supra note 68, at 1192 (de-
scribing the results of conceptually severing elements of property ownership).
91 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-38.
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preventing plans to build a fifty-story tower on top of the building. 92
Even before the introduction of the Lucas per se rule for total eco-
nomic loss, Penn Central argued that such a significant deprivation
should weigh favorably for determining the economic impact of the
regulation on its investment-backed expectations." The Penn Central
Court, however, declined to look exclusively at the value of the "air
rights" and instead, measured the economic impact against the com-
pany's investment-backed expectations in the property as a whole."
Using the investment of a property owner to measure the eco-
nomic impact of a regulation, as this method purports to do, could
result in inequitable results. 95 For example, compare the interference
with the investment of a long-time property owner who has recovered
any initial investment in the property with a recent investor who in-
vested a similar amount but has yet to see a return on the invest-
ment." Those two owners, with similar investments in similar proper-
ties, might be treated differently under the Takings Clause due largely
to the length of time they owned the property in question. 97 Similarly,
it is not clear that the economic impact factor would have resulted in
the same outcome in Penn Central if applied to a developer who had
purchased the same property, only a few years before, intending to
develop a skyscraper. 98 As an illustration of that point, consider that of
particular significance to the Court in Penn Central was the fact that
the property could still be used profitably as a train station and rental
office space." In fact, the Court went beyond even the investment in
the parcel in question in applying the economic impact factor, noting
that the designation of landmark status and the transferable devel-
opment rights that accompanied such status would benefit other
property held by the same company. 199 Essentially, the Court ex-
92
 Id. at 119.
92
 Id, at 130.
% See id.
Ds Sec infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
as See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 135-38 (discussing length of ownership as a factor in tak-
ings analysis).
91 Sec id.
98 See id. at 137 n.36. Professor Frank I. Michelman, in an article that predates Penn
Central but upon which Penn Central relied in its reasoning, justifies this inequity to the
extent that such a measure protects the special kind of harm that comes from the psycho-
logical impact a property owner suffers when her actual, legally distinct expectations are
thwarted seemingly as the result of unprincipled exploitation. See Michelman, supra note
68, at 1229-31.
99 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 129,136,138 n.36.
100 See id. at 115,138.
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panded the denominator beyond the bounds of the property in ques-
don to encompass additional property held by the same owner," 1
B. Rejection of Conceptual Severance and Temporal Severance,
and the Expansion of Regulatory Takings
Law Beyond Real Property
Penn Central, in which the Supreme Court emphasized that regu-
latory takings analyses would look to the parcel as a whole as the ap-
propriate denominator, effectively rejected physical severance. 02
Conceptual severance, however, remained a troubling problem de-
spite the Court's attempt to emphasize the importance of measuring
the "parcel as a whole."'" The difficulty in determining the appropri-
ate denominator only grew as claimants began to argue for temporal
severance as a specific instance of conceptual severance.'" In 2002, in
Tahoe
-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
landowners argued that they should be compensated under the Lucas
"total economic loss" per se rule because they temporarily lost all
economic value in their land during a thirty-two month development
moratorium. 105 The Court dismissed their argument, attempting to
declare an end to all severance—physical, conceptual, and tempo-
ral—and thus rein in the denominator problem that had grown so
troublesome.m Emphasizing Penn Central' s end to physical severance,
the Court went on to deny conceptual severance, declaring that the
destruction of one strand from the bundle of property rights is not a
101 See id. at 138; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (describing the Penn Central ap-
proach as "extreme" and "unsupportable"); Rose, supra note 77, at 567-68 (describing
Penn Centrals "expansive" measure of dimunition of value against all of the Company's
property).
102 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130. In addition to the holding in Penn Central., the event
that prevented physical severance from creating the same confusion that occurred in the
area of conceptual severance was the holding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., which declared all permanent physical invasions to be per se takings. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982). It does not matter
with respect to which parcel the size of the taking is measured if every physical invasion is a
taking, no matter how small. See id.
los See Penn Cent„ 438 U.S. at 130-31.
104
 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1980) (Brennan,,)., dissenting).
105 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S, at 320.
X06
	 id. at 326-27; sec also Thomas E. Roberts, Regulatory Takings in the Wake of Tahoe-
Sierra and the IOLTA Decision, 35 URB. LAW. 759, 759-63 (2003) (decribing Tahoe-Sierra's
resolution of the question of severance).
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taking. 187 In addition, Tahoe-Sierra explicitly rejected temporal sever-
ance. 108 The Court declined to apply the Lucas per se rule to the tem-
porary loss of all economic use of the property, turning instead to the
multifactor test laid out in Penn. Central. 10
In 1982, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Su-
preme Court created yet another per se rule as an exception to the
Penn Central multifactor test."' In Loretto, a New York City law required
that apartment building owners permit cable companies to lay cable
along the outside of their buildings." The space occupied by the cable
and junction box on Jean Loretto's building was estimated to be ap-
proximately one square foot.'" The Court relied heavily on the tradi-
tional strength of property owners' right to exclude, characterizing it as
one of the most important rights in the "bundle of sticks."'" Because of
the significance of the right to exclude, the Court declared that any
permanent, physical invasion of property, no matter how small, is a tak-
ing. 11 " Even the minimal imposition of a wire laid across a building
triggered the protections of the Takings Clause, because it resulted in a
permanent physical imposition which deserved the strongest protec-
tion of the Takings Clause" is
In the years since Pennsylvania Coal, regulatory takings cases have
expanded beyond protecting interests in land." 5 Recent cases have
considered requiring compensation for required disclosure of trade
secrets117 and retroactive liability for employee health benefits, among
other things."' Some of the most challenging applications of the Tak-
ings Clause to personal property involve government appropriations
107 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327.
ma See id. at 331-32.
"'a Id. at 332.
110 See 458 U.S. at 432.
Id. at 423.
112 Id. at 438 n.16.
115 See id. at 426.
114 See id. at 434.
115 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438.
"a See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found, of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231 (2003) (applying the
Takings Clause to appropriations of interest earned on accounts); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (finding a taking as a result of legislation requiring retroactive con-
tributions to pension plans); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984)
(finding a taking could result from legislation requiring disclosure of trade secrets).
" 7
 See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
18 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537.
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of money. 119 The Supreme Court has applied the Takings Clause to
government appropriations of money in at least three cases,'" but
some commentators question whether this is a reasonable or workable
use of the Takings Clause. 121 There are several arguments against us-
ing the Takings Clause to prohibit government appropriations of
money, but perhaps the most constitutionally compelling one is that if
courts applied the Takings Clause to appropriations of money, then
the plenary power of the government to tax would be confused with
its limited ability to appropriate property without compensation. 122 An
investigation into the circumstances under which the Takings Clause
provides the appropriate framework to analyze appropriations of
money is beyond the scope of this Note. 123 Relying on those cases
which have already applied the Takings Clause to monetary exactions,
this Note assumes the general applicability of the Takings Clause to
government appropriations of money. 124
119 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 231-41; Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,163-72
(1998); E. Enters., 524 U.S. 529-37; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
160-164 (1980).
12° See Brown, 538 U.S. at 231-35; Phillips, 524 U.S. at 163-68; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160-
64,
121 See EPSTEIN, supra note 68, at 99-100,283-305 (arguing that the Takings Clause
applies equally to taxes and appropriations and regulations of real property); Robert
Brauneis, Eastern Enterprises, Phillips, Money, and the Limited Role of the Compensation Clause
in Protecting Property in Its Larger and Juster Meaning," 51 ALA. L. REV 937,938 (2000) (re-
jecting the bundle of rights metaphor, and arguing that the Takings Clause should protect
ordinary objects and not legal rights); Michael Allen Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Person-
ally: The Perils of (Mis)Reasoning by Analogy, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1355,1361-62 (2000) (arguing
that the Takings Clause should not apply to government exactions of money, and that
instead the constitutionality of such exactions should be decided under the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses).
122 See Brauneis, supra note 121, at 944-97. Brauneis argues that only specific liabilities
imposed by the government, associated with identifiable pieces of property, should be
subject to the Takings Clause, and that general monetary liabilities, like those imposed in
Eastern Enterprises, should be analyzed under the ability of the government to tax. See id.
123 For a more in depth discussion of this problem, see EPSTEIN, supra note 68, at 283-
305; Brauneis, supra note 121, at 947-48; Wolf, supra note 121, at 1356-63.
124 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 231-35; E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529-37; Phillips, 524 U.S. at
163-68; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160-69. The case for the application of the Takings Clause in
Givens v. Alabama Department of Corrections was strengthened by the fact that in that case, the
interest was taken in addition to a statutorily limited percentage appropriated as a fee. See
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162; Givens v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064,1065 (11th Cir. 2004).
This prevented the Department of Corrections from recharacterizing the appropriation of
the interest as a fee or tax. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1065.
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C. Applying Regulatory Takings Law to Takings of Interest Instead of the
Severed "Interest Follows Principal" Approach
Courts seem to pay little attention to the history of regulatory
takings in their analyses of the inmate interest cases. 125 Each court
presented with the question has relied entirely on the "interest follows
principal" rule to guide the discussion, weighing the relative strength
of that rule against the common law rule that prisoners hold minimal
property rights in the fruits of their labor.'" The "interest follows
principal" rule, however, artificially separates the ownership of princi-
pal and the earned interest in a way that is surprisingly similar to the
now discarded notion of conceptual severance.'" The right to earn
interest on principal, and to direct that interest to designated
beneficiaries, is just one right from the bundle of rights that repre-
sents ownership of the principal. 128 Put in a slightly different way,
courts could approach the issue as one of a temporary taking of the
principal rather than a total taking of the interest, as Justice Breyer
suggested in his dissenting opinion in Phillips. 129 If courts employed
that analysis, the practice of focusing on whether an inmate "owns"
the interest earned distinct from the principal would be revealed as
equivalent to temporal severance, with the interest retained by the
department of corrections representing the value of the temporary
ownership of the principal. 180 Courts would use the interest lost as
only one measure of the economic value of owning the principal for a
period of time."' If the courts looked at the ownership of the "parcel
as a whole" both temporally and conceptually, instead of splitting
their discussion into distinct inquiries into principal and interest, a
very different analysis would result. 182
125 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185-86; Schneider, 151 F.3d at
1199.
126 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185-86; Schneider, 151 F.3d at
1199.
127 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185-86; Schneider 151 F.3d at
1199.
I 25 See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.
129 See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 180 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Oddly, although Justice Breyer
suggests the temporary taking of the principal as the starting point for his analysis, he
seems to assume that even so, the appropriate rule in most cases is still that "interest fol-
lows principal." See id.
15° See id.; cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1945)
(finding the compensation due after a temporary taking of a warehouse includes the
rental value of the property for the period of time during which it was taken).
151 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 328-30; General Motors, 323 U.S. at 381-83.
152 See infra notes 133-238 and accompanying text.
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III. ANALYSIS: APPLYING REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW TO FIND No
TAKING OF INTEREST
Abandoning the artificial, conceptual severance of interest and
principal results in the prisoner interest cases appearing as instances
of temporary regulatory limits on principal, which prevent the owners
from using principal to earn interest.'" This analysis replaces the cur-
rent analysis which sees a potential taking of two distinct properties,
the conceptually severed principal and its interest, and its reliance on
the common law "interest follows principal" mantra.'" One of the
first hurdles to this analysis is determining which of the several estab-
lished judicial tests of regulatory takings provides the most appropri-
ate and consistent framework,"5 Complicating the question of which
test to use in the case of the prisoner interest cases is the unusual cir-
cumstance of applying the Takings Clause to money and not real
property.'" This is because, in such instances, the courts' reliance on
conceptual severance and the "interest follows principal" rule resulted
either in finding no property interest to trigger a takings analysis or
the total interest to be completely taken, so that the court never
identified the appropriate test.'"
A. Determining Which Regulatory Takings Test Is the Most Appropriate to
Apply to Takings of Interest
The Penn. Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York multifactor
test, the Lucas per se rule, and the Loretto per se rule are the most
relevant tests within the regulatory takings jurisprudence.'" In 2003,
in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, the Supreme Court decided
1" See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 180 (1998) (Breyer,]., dissenting);
cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1945) (finding the com-
pensation due after a temporary taking of a warehouse includes the rental value of the
property for the period of time during which it was taken).
134 Sec Brown v. Legal Found, of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 234 (2003); Phillips, 524 U.S. at
164; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162-64 (1980); Givens v. Ala.
Dep't of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064, 1067-70 (11th Cir. 2004); Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d




Brown, 538 U.S. at 233-35.
186 See Brauneis, supra note 121, at 937-38; Wolf, supra note 121, at 1355-57.
187 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185-86; Schneider; 151 F.3d at
1201.
188 Sec Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Loretto v. Telepromp-
ter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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the second of the two IOLTA cases by analogy to "the kind of per se
taking that occurred in Loretto."'" The Court did so because it was de-
ciding whether the loss of interest was a taking, without reference to
the use of the principal.'" In Eastern Enteilnises v. Apfel, in contrast, a
plurality of the Supreme Court found that a general liability to pay
the government is not the kind of permanent physical occupation that
invokes the Loretto per se rule."' The difference in the Court's deci-
sion to apply the Loretto per se rule in the two cases might be because
in Brown, the Court dealt with the appropriation of specific funds and
in Eastern Enterprises, the Court dealt with the imposition of a general
monetary obligation. 142 Although the distinction between general and
specific obligations may be useful to distinguish between those mone-
tary exactions which should be treated as a tax and those which
should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause, that distinction is
less useful in determining whether an appropriation of money is like
a permanent, physical invasion.'" The right to exclude formed the
basis, in large part, for the Loretto per se rule."' In the case of mone-
tary takings, however, there is no question of a right to exclude; only
rights to disposition and use are implicated. 145 Taking into account
the vague language surrounding the mention of Loretto in Brown, it
does not make sense to use Loretto's physical invasion test, which was
developed to protect the right to exclude others from land.'"
The "exclusive possession" justification for the Loretto rule high-
lights one of the interesting wrinkles of applying the Takings Clause
to money, and one of the reasons why money may be less protected by
the Takings Clause than land or personal property. 147 The most pro-
tected element from the bundle of rights with respect to property in
139 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 235. The Court went on to find that no compensation was
due despite the per se taking because the interest lost had no economic value to the owner
of the principal. See id. at 239-40.
10
 See id. at 234.
141 See E. Enters. v Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,530 (1998) (plurality opinion).
142 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 235; E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 530; see also Brauneis, supra note
121, at 937 (discussing the distinction between general liabilities, like taxes, and specific
property interests, which are governed by the Takings Clause).
143 See Brauneis, supra note 121, at 943-44 (arguing that specific and general obliga-
tions deserve different treatment under the Constitution).
144
 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; see also Radin, supra note 86, at 1678-80.
145 Sec Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; see also Radin, supra note 86, at 1678-80.
146
 Sec Brown, 538 U.S. at 235.
147 Sec supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
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regulatory takings cases is the right to exclude. 148 In questions of tak-
ing money, however, the right to exclude has no meaning. 149 The only
meaningful property rights to protect with respect to money are the
right to use and dispose of 10" Although certainly worthy of protec-
tion, the Supreme Court has not protected these rights as strongly as
the right to exclude. 151
B. The Lucas Per Se Test Is Not Appropriate for Takings of Money
The Lucas per se test presents an attractive alternative to the Lor-
etto test when applied to the appropriations of money. 152 The Lucas
test finds a per se taking when a property owner loses all economically
beneficial or productive use of land.'" Rather than protecting the ex-
clusive possession of land, as in Loretto, the Lucas test protects the use
of land, which is a more meaningful right with respect to money. 154
On the one hand, if the interest and principal in the prisoner cases
were considered separately, then because the departments of correc-
tions completely appropriated the interest, the "no economically vi-
able use" interpretation of the loss of interest becomes appealing. 155
On the other hand, when the test is applied to the money "as a
whole," that is, to the interest and principal together, application of
this test appears less appropriate because some economically
beneficial use remains for the principa1. 156
Application of the Lucas test requires overcoming two hurdles,'"
First, the Supreme Court limited the Lucas rule to real property, explic-
1 '18 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Loretto, 458 U.S. at
435; see also Raclin, supra note 86, at 1678-80 (discussing the importance of the right to
exclude in recent takings jurisprudence generally, and arguing that courts engage in con-
ceptual severance primarily in cases where to do so would protect an owner's right to ex-
clude).
149 See, e.g. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235 (omitting any reference to the right to exclude in
determining the nature of the taking of money).
156 See General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378 (listing the three protected rights with respect to
property as the rights to possess, use, and dispose of property).
151 Compare Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36 (relying strongly on the importance of protect-
ing the right to exclusive possession), with Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)
(holding that the relatively weak protection for the right to dispose of property supported
the lack of violation of the Takings Clause for eliminating the right to sell property).
152 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
153 505 U.S. at 1019.
154 See Id.
155 See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1201.
156 Cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
157 See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying notes.
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itly rendering it inapplicable to personal property. 158 While at first
glance that appears to provide a strong argument for declining to apply
the Lucas rule to appropriations of money, the justification for the
Court's limitation suggests a potentially reasonable extension to appro-
priations or limitations on use of money.' 59 The Court relied on the
understanding that owners of personal property hold their property
with the expectation that government regulations may someday render
it valueless. 160 According to the Court, however, owners of real property
have no such understanding, and expect that regulations may diminish,
but not erase, the value of their land. MI The viability of an extension of
the Lucas rule from land to money then turns on whether owners of
money hold their money with the expectation that government regula-
tion may cause their money to become worthless, or merely less valu-
able. 162 The answer to whether extension of the Lucas rule is reasonable
is beyond the scope of this Note. The result is the same whether or not
the ownership of principal and interest are considered separately, as
when the two are conceptually severed, or as part of a unified "parcel as
a whole."163 Either the Lucas per se rule is inappropriate to apply to ei-
ther principal or interest, leading to application of the Penn Central
multifactor test,Im or Lucas would be potentially appropriate for both,
leading to the second hurdle described below. 165
Assuming that the Lucas test can provide an appropriate frame-
work for analyzing regulatory takings of money, the test also requires
showing that the property owner has lost "all economically beneficial
or productive use" of the propertym In this inquiry, a difference
emerges between the analysis that severs interest and principal and
one that joins the two. 167 Any Lucas argument that relies upon the fact
that the inmates have lost all economically viable use of their interest
also relies on the conceptual severance of the interest from the prin-
cipal. 168 Under a "parcel as a whole" approach, in contrast, the rele-
158 See Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1027-28. The Court limited the no economically viable use"
per se rule to real property in part because the Court had already held that denying the
ability to sell property at all was not necessarily a taking. See id.; Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66-67.








154 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
165 See ed. at 1015-16.
166 Sec id. at 1015.
167 See id. at 1016 n.7.
188
 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 234-35; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 169; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1201.
2005]	 Interest, Principal, and Conceptual Severance	 883
vant inquiry is whether the inmates retain any economically viable use
of the principal or interest. 169 The ability to earn interest represents
only one use of the principal.'" In each of the prisoner interest cases
the inmate is at least permitted to retain the principal after leaving
prison, so the deprivation imposed by the regulation is at most a tem-
porary total economic deprivation.'" Under the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Tahoe-Sierra, even a total economic deprivation, if it is only
temporary, does not automatically trigger a per se taking.'" In Wash-
lefske and Schneider, inmates were able to spend principal from prison
accounts in the prison commissary and so retained some economi-
cally viable use of the principal even while in prison.'" In Washlefske,
inmates were permitted to send the principal to recipients outside the
prison, including for deposit in interest-bearing accounts, 174 Thus,
inmates retained at least some use of their principal.'" Because in-
mates retain significant rights to use and dispose of their principal
during and after incarceration, application of the Lucas per se test
would fail for lack of a total economic deprivation. 176 This result
would differ if the analysis viewed the loss of interest independent
from the use of the principal. 177
C. Applying the Penn Central Multzfactor Test
Discarding both the Lucas and the Loretto per se rules, the remain-
ing test is the Penn Central multifactor approach, 1 " As articulated by the
Supreme Court in Penn Central, the multifactor approach imposes no
set formula but rather requires a series of "ad hoc, factual inquiries"
into the "particular circumstances of that case." 179 Among the relevant
factors, the Court lists the character of the governmental action, the
economic impact of the regulation, and its interference with distinct,
investment-backed expectations. 18°
169 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
170 See Philip's, 524 U.S. at 180 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.
171 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1065; Washlefshe, 234 F.3d at 181; Schneider; 151 F.3d at 1195.
172 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332
(2002).
173 Sec Washkfske, 234 F.3d at 181; Schneider; 151 F.3d at 1195.
04 See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181.
1173 See id.
175 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
177 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 235; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164; Schneider; 151 F.3d at 1201.
179 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334; Penn' Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
179 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24.
180 See id. at 124.
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1. The Character of the Government Action Prong
The Court first described the character of the governmental ac-
tion prong in Penn Central, explaining that a regulation that imposed
a physical invasion on a property owner was worse than a regulation
that "adjusted the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good."181 Four years later, Loretto, which found a per se
taking in all cases of a permanent physical invasion, supplanted the
physical invasion element of this factor. 182 The other element of the
"character" prong as first described in Penn. Central is whether or not
the regulation in question merely "adjusts benefits and burdens" for
the common good. 183 For the most part, the public use requirement
of the Takings Clause does not determine the outcome of the "char-
acter" factor. 184 In more recent cases, courts interpret the "common
good" element of the character of the governmental action to include
whether the regulation in question was imposed retroactively, whether
the regulation targeted a small number of people or entities to bear a
communal burden, as well as the importance of the government pur-
pose the taking served. 185
In the prisoner interest cases, the character of the governmental
action prong of the multifactor test results in either a neutral out-
come or a finding of no taking. 186 The laws foreclosing the ability to
earn interest do not represent a physical invasion, and so fail under
that element of the character of the government action prong in the
initial Penn Central articulation of the test. 187 The laws also pass the low
hurdle of appropriately "adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life," a hurdle which differs little from the "public use" re-
quirement of any government taking. 188 In Washlefske and Schneider;
181 See id.; see also FISCHEL, supra note 67, at 50 (noting that the court provided little
guidance in interpreting the broad parameters laid out by this prong).
1E2 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35; see also Peterson, supra note 76, at 1317-18 (explain-
ing that before Loretto, courts used the 'character' prong to ask whether there was a physi-
cal invasion).
lag See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
184 See Peterson, supra note 76, at 1318-19.
185 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537; Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1350-51 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); see also Peterson, supra note 76, at 1317-19 (arguing that recent developments
in the character of the governmental action prong are moving towards incorporating the
retroactive or targeted nature of the action).
188 See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
187 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. But see Brown, 538 U.S. at 235 (suggesting the Loretto
per se rule for takings of interest).
188 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; see also Peterson, supra note 76, at 1318-19.
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this factor could strengthen the Departments of Corrections' argu-
ment because the regulation required the interest to be deposited in a
fund that went toward the benefit of the inmates. 189 Even under the
recent expansion of this element, the regulations in question are not
retroactive and do not appear to unfairly target a small group. 19° The
character of the government action prong of the multifactor test,
therefore, appears to weigh against the inmates. 191 This result remains
unchanged whether or not the interest is conceptually severed from
the principal or the two are treated as a single parcel, because the
relative magnitude of the regulation's impact is irrelevant to the out-
come of this factor. 192
2. The Economic Impact Prong
The economic impact prong and the interference with distinct,
investment-backed expectations prong of the multifactor test have
evolved through several interpretations since the Supreme Court de-
scribed them in 1978. 193 In the Court's initial introduction of the mul-
tifactor test in Penn. Central, the economic impact prong included the
investment-backed expectation inquiry as one element.'" In later
cases, however, the Court separated the two into two distinct factors of
a three-factor test.'" The economic impact prong, when applied in-
dependently from the investment-backed expectations prong, in ac-
cordance with courts' most recent practice, measures only the dollar
amount of the economic loss suffered by the property owner. 196
'9° See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181; Schneider; 151 F,3d at 1195.
IN See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1065-66;Washiefske, 234 F.3d at 181-82; Schneider; 151 F.3d at
1195-.96.
191 See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
'92 Sec Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164-65 (finding a taking as a result of the overwhelming eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the loss of interest, but omitting any discussion of the
character of the government action).
I" See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 n.10; E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529; Penn Cent., 438 U.S.
at 124; see also Calvert G. Chipcase, From Grand Central to the Sierras: What Do We Do with
Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 VA. ENvm. L.J. 43, 56-66
(2004) (discussing evolution from "distinct" to "reasonable" investment-backed expecta-
tions); Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of "Investment-Backed Expectations," 32 URB. LAW.
437, 442-46 (2000) (following the evolution from distinct to reasonable investment-backed
expectations); Peterson, supra note 76, at 1320, 1325-27 (chronicling the variety of inter-
pretations of these terms).
191 See Penn Cent,, 438 U.S. at 124.
195 Sce, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 n.10; Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
617 (2001); E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529.
'9° See, e.g., Brown, 538 U.S. at 235; E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529; see also Peterson, supra
note 76, at 1325.
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In the inmate interest cases, the outcome of the economic impact
prong is identical regardless of whether a court separates the interest
from the principal or examines the interest and the principal to-
gether as an entire parcel. 197 In both analyses, the economic impact of
the regulation is the dollar amount of the economic loss of the in-
mate, which is equivalent to the lost interest. 198 The regulation "took"
exactly one right from the prisoner with respect to his property; the
right to earn interest on principal earned from a work release pro-
gram.'" The dollar amount of the economic impact is difficult to es-
tablish because neither the amount of money the inmates would have
earned as interest, nor the total amount of interest earned by the de-
partments of corrections, appear in Givens or Schneidam In Washlef-
ske, the court notes that interest from the pooled amounts of all in-
mate accounts (none of which provided interest to inmates) earned
the Department of Corrections $5,479.45 in 1998. 201 In addition to
that amount, the prison also earned an average of $59.86 per month
from a smaller checking account made up of inmate accounts." 2
Interpretation of that dollar amount of economic loss—the in-
terest lost, in other words—in the multifactor test is less straightfor-
ward. 203 Washlefske contained the amount of money the Department of
Corrections earned, but not the corresponding loss to the individual
inmate. 204 The economic impact of a potential taking is measured
from the perspective of what the claimant lost, not what the govern-
ment gained. 203 Whether that economic impact is so severe as to rise
to the level of a taking depends on how large an impact the regula-
tion imposed in comparison to the remaining rights and economic
value the property owner retained in the property. 206 This is the famil-
197 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 234-35; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1119.
198 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 234-35; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160; Schneider; 151 F.3d at 1119.
199 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 234-35; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164; Schneider; 151 F.3d at 1119.
298 See Givens, 381 F.3d 1064; Schneider, 151 F.3d 1194.
20' Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181.
282 See id. Washlefske also includes the most detailed information about the amount of
money involved from the perspective of an individual inmate. See id. The inmate in this
case earned an average of $108.76 per month from being paid $0.90 per hour for labor
while in prison. See id. The inmate kept an average monthly closing balance of $87.05 in
the two non-interest-bearing accounts maintained in his name by the Department of Cor-
rections. See id.
298 SeeF tscHEL, supra note 67, at 50-51; Peterson, supra note 76, at 1325.
284 See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181-82.
298 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 236-37.
200 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 530-32; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36 (finding
significant the remaining use of Grand Central as a train station in limiting the strength of
the economic impact).
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iar denominator problem, and it provided the original motivation for
the investment-backed expectations prong of the multifactor test. 207
Courts that have divorced the two prongs have nevertheless been
forced to find other methods to weigh the outcome of this prong. 2°8
In all of the prisoner interest cases, inmates were able to use and
dispose of the principal in at least some way while in prison.209 In
some cases, inmates could transfer the principal to recipients outside
the prison.20 In other cases, inmates could spend the principal within
the prison in the commissary. 211 In all cases, the principal would be
returned to the inmate at the conclusion of the prison term.212 Al-
though none of the facts relating to the use and disposition of the
principal is relevant when considering the deprivation of the interest
alone, these facts do become relevant when looking at the entirety of
both the principal and the interest as a unified parcel. 213 Under a
unified analysis of the parcel as a whole, and thus viewing earned in-
terest as only one of many uses attaching to ownership of the princi-
pal, the loss of that interest is no longer a per se taking because the
size of the deprivation of interest appears less significant with respect
to the remaining uses of the principal. 214
201 Sec Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; see also Michelman, supra note 68, at 1229-34 (using
the distinctly perceived interest of the property owner (or, the owner's "investment-backed
expectations") to define the boundaries of the affected parcel for purposes of measuring
the extent of harm).
248 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 530-32 (finding significant the lack of proportionality be-
tween the economic impact and the claimant's participation in the affected regulatory
scheme).
288 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1065 (concerning prisoners able to make withdrawals from
the "PMOD" account); Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181 (explaining that money from 'spend
accounts" in prison may be spent in the prison commissary, and inmates may send money
outside the prison to be invested in interest-bearing accounts, but at least $25 must remain
in a "hold account"); Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1195 (explaining that only money from a non-
interest-bearing ITA" can be spent in the prison commissary, and an interest-bearing
"IPSA" may only be established if there is at least $25 in an "FM").
210 See Waslilefske 234 F.3d at 181; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1195.
211 See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1195.
212 See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181; Schneider; 151 F.3d at 1195.
212 Sec Brown, 538 U.S. at 234-35; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164; Schneider; 151 F.3d at 1201 (all
three cases looking at the loss of interest without considering the remaining use of princi-
pal).
214 See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66 (finding that loss of one "stick in the bundle," the
right to disposition, does not necessarily constitute a taking).
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3. The Interference with Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
Prong
The final prong of the Penn Central multifactor test is the extent
to which the regulation interferes with distinct, investment-backed
expectations. 215 This prong of the test has caused courts considerable
difficulty over the years, so much so that even the term itself has
evolved. 216 Professor Frank I. Michelman first introduced the term in
his article, describing it as a "distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized,
investment-backed expectation,"217 and Justice Brennan adopted it in
Penn Central as "distinct investment-backed expectations." 218 In later
Supreme Court cases, the inquiry became one of "reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations."219 The test initially measured whether the
economic impact of a regulation had gone too far. 220 In recent years,
though, the prong has developed a life of its own, sometimes taking
on new meaning, and sometimes being ignored entirely. 221 A modern
interpretation of distinct or reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions involves the amount of notice afforded the property owner (less
215 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
216 See FISCIJEL, supra note 67, at 50-51; Peterson, supra note 76, at 1320-25; see also
Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 181; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1195.
217 Michelman, supra note 68, at 1233.
21°
 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
219 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 44 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
220 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Michelman, supra note 68, at 1233. Professor
Michelman's method for determining when compensation should be due required deter-
mining "demoralization costs" which he defined as
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to
losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no com-
pensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of the lost
future production ... caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers,
their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they
themselves may be subject to similar treatment on some occasion.
Michelman, supra note 68, at 1214. Interference with "distinctly perceived, sharply crystal-
lized, investment-backed expectation" leads to high demoralization costs. See id. at 1229-34.
For a refeshingly clear explanation of this analysis, see Fisci-iti, supm note 67, at 142-51.
221 See Chipcase, supra note 193, at 66-73 (arguing that "reasonable" should be dis-
carded and courts should return to "distinct"); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV, 1369, 1371-72 (arguing
against the use of reasonable expectations as a test for notice); Robert J. Goldstein, The
Future of Environmental Law: Adjusting Expectations After Tahoe-Sierra, 19 PACE Dorn- L.
REv. 489, 497-99 (2002) (arguing for limiting "reasonable" to "ecologically supportable");
Gregory M. Stein, Takings in the 21st Century: Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations After
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69 TENN. L. Rev. 891, 910-19, 935-37 (2002) (following the
emergence of notice as a replacement for the otherwise ambiguous "investment-backed
expectations").
2005]	 Interest, Principal, and Conceptual Severance 	 889
protection is provided for those in highly regulated industries, and
more protection is provided for retroactive regulations) and any rea-
sonable reliance the owner had on the absence of the regulation. 222
In this more recent incarnation, divorced from the economic
impact of the regulation, the investment-backed expectations prong
of the multifactor test fails to fulfill its initial purpose—how to meas-
ure the relative importance of economic loss on a property owner by
determining a comparative property loss. 223 For example, a million-
dollar economic impact may, in isolation, appear significant, but not if
it occurs with respect to a piece of property valued at several billion
dollars.224 Similarly, an economic impact of a few hundred dollars may
seem trivial to a court unless it is revealed that it is lost from a piece of
property worth only one thousand dollars. 225 This, of course, is a ver-
sion of the "denominator problem" mentioned above. 226
Applying the earlier version of the investment-backed expecta-
tions test to the prisoner interest cases, the question becomes to what
extent does a prisoner perceive the right to earn interest as a distinct
right, crystallized and worthy of protection. 227 One indicator of such a
right would be an owner's. independent, "distinct" investment in such
a right, but other indicators are possible.228 For example, the legal
treatment of principal/interest cases, which analyzes the two parts
separately, would argue for a common understanding of the right to
earn interest as a distinct, protectable interest. 229 The right to earn
interest on principal, however, is not ordinarily considered a separate,
protected right attached to property ownership. 23° The air rights at
issue in Penn Central, for example, are more easily thought of as dis-
222 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 532.-36 (discussing retroactivity under reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations prong); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007
(1984) (finding no reasonable investment-backed expectation because plaintiff had
sufficient notice of the regulation); Appolo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1349-50 (finding notice and a
highly regulated industry relevant to the reasonable investment-backed expectation analy-
sis).
225 See Penn Cent„ 438 U.S. at 124; Michelman, supra note 68, at 1229-34.
224 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36 (finding no taking because the property could
still be profitably used as a railroad station); id. at 141 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing the lost revenue resulting from the regulation as at least $3 million per year); see also
Rose, supra note 77, at 566-69.
225 See Michelman, supra note 68, at 1190; Rose, supra note 77, at 566-69.
228 See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
227 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25; Michelman, supra note 68, at 1233.
228 See Penn Cent., 938 U.S. at 124-25; Michelman, supra note 68, at 1233.
229 See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 163-66; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160-62; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068;
Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185-86; Schneider; 1199-201.
250 See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (discussing interest as government created value).
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tinct from the ownership of the earth underneath, both legally (with
the invention of "transferable development rights") and physically; yet
the Supreme Court declined to find that the loss of value of those air
rights involved separable, distinct, investment-backed expectations. 231
Under a unified, "parcel as the whole" analysis, the investment-backed
expectations prong of the Penn Central test would probably weigh in
favor of the department of corrections, reasoning that the economic
impact of the lost interest is a relatively insignificant imposition on
inmates given the remaining uses of the principal. 232
An analysis of the investment-backed expectations prong using
more recent court interpretations based on notice or reliance is also
likely to weigh in favor of no taking,233 Inmates are in a highly regulated
environment, calling into question any reasonable expectation they
may have for earning interest. 234 In one sense, inmates' reliance on the
interest might be great because they have no other options. 233 A prison
is such a heavily regulated environment, however, that a court is likely
to find that reliance unreasonable. 236 Furthermore, notice problems
are minimal because the regulations are not retroactive and inmates
are informed of the regulation before depositing money in the prison
accounts. 237 Thus, under either early or late versions of the investment-
backed expectations prong, a court would likely find that the interfer-
ence with prisoners' expectations is relatively minor when considered
in conjunction with the remaining benefits of ownership of principal,
leading this prong to weigh against finding a taking. 238
CONCLUSION
Courts that rely on the "interest follows principal" rule incorpo-
rate the idea of conceptual severance into regulatory takings law. This
conflicts with the development of regulatory takings decisions, which
have consistently attempted to disavow the practice of conceptual sev-
erance. The most explicit disavowal of conceptual severance has come
in decisions concerning attempted temporal severance, yet the uni-
2!1 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130.
232 See id. at 137-38.
253 See, e.g., E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 533-36; Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005-08,
254
 See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007; Appal° Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1349.
235 See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1196.
"See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007; Appolo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1349; see also Eagle, supra
note 193, at 443-44.
237 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 532-36; Appolo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1350.
238 See supra notes 215-37 and accompanying text.
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versally applied "interest follows principal" rule is an example of tem-
poral severance. Although such a rule may have been useful in the
eighteenthth century, and is still useful in many areas of the law, in
the area of regulatory takings, it is no longer needed. Not only would
the disavowal of the "interest follows principal" rule be consistent with
the rest of regulatory takings law, but this is one circumstance in
which an application of regulatory takings doctrine would provide a
clearer, rather than more ambiguous, outcome.
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